1. Ocasio 1997 Chicago Bulls
2. Ocasio 1997 Topps
3. Ocasio 1997 Fleer

May 09, 2019 Rep. Ocasio-Cortez expressed shock over her new garbage disposal in a 6 May 2019 Instagram video. As noted in the 1997 newspaper clipping shown above, New Yorkers weren’t “exactly lining. Martin Dean Ocasio, 1997 - 2011. Martin Dean Ocasio was born on August 6 1997. Martin lived in USA. Martin passed away on January 3 2011, at age 13.

Ocasio v. United States, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court clarified whether the Hobbs Act's definition of conspiracy to commit extortion only includes attempts to acquire property from someone who is not a member of the conspiracy.^[1] The case arose when Samuel Ocasio, a former Baltimore, Maryland police officer, was indicted for participating in a kickback scheme with an automobile repair shop where officers would refer drivers of damaged vehicles to the shop in exchange for cash payments.^[2] Ocasio argued that he should not be found guilty of conspiring to commit extortion because the only property that was exchanged in the scheme was transferred from one member of the conspiracy to another, and an individual cannot be found guilty of conspiring to extort a co-conspirator.^[3]

June 26, 2019 Pat Ocasio has an impressive track record. In 1997, she joined Program Executive Office Enterprise Information Systems (PEO EIS) as a product support contractor for the Transportation. Steven here I'm 27, a car enthusiast; started this youtube fling just as a dope, chill hobby and slowly but surely has been turning into a future 🙏🏻. Feel free to subscribe if you enjoy.

Writing for a majority of the Court, JusticeSamuel Alito held that a conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act can occur when an individual obtains property from another conspirator under the pretense that they have an official right to take that property.^[4] Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he suggested that the Court may need to revisit prior cases that have held that 'extortion' is roughly equivalent to 'bribery'.^[5] Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he also argued that the Court should overturn a line of cases that has conflated the definition of extortion with bribery, and he also argued that the majority's opinion was inconsistent with principles of federalism.^[6] Justice Sonia Sotomayor also wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the majority's opinion was inconsistent with the plain language of the Hobbs Act as well as the Court's prior conspiracy law jurisprudence.^[7] Although some commentators have stated that the case is consistent with prior precedent,^[8] at least one commentator has suggested that the case will 'raise more questions than answers.'^[9]

Background[edit]

Between 2008 and 2011, at least 60 Baltimore, Maryland police officers engaged in a kickback scheme with an automobile repair shop.^[10] When these officers responded to traffic accidents, they would refer motorists to the repair shop in exchange for payments of $150 to $300 for every referral.^[2] Samuel Ocasio was a former Baltimore police officer who participated in this scheme between 2009 and 2011.^[10] He was charged under the Hobbs Act^[11] for extorting money from the automobile repair shop.^[2] Before his trial began, Ocasio sought a jury instruction that would have required the jury to find, as a prerequisite for convicting him for conspiracy to commit extortion, that 'the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy was to obtain money or property from some person who was not a member of the conspiracy'.^[12] The United States District Court for the District of Maryland ultimately refused to provide Ocasio's proposed instruction and Ocasio was found guilty on one count of conspiracy and three counts of extortion.^[13] On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Ocasio argued that 'his conspiracy conviction was fatally flawed because the conspirators had not agreed to obtain money from a person who was not a member of the conspiracy', but the Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction.^[14] Ocasio appealed again, and on March 2, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.^[15]

Opinion of the Court[edit]

Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Samuel Alito held that to be found guilty of conspiracy, a 'defendant must merely reach an agreement with the 'specific intent that the underlying crime be committed' by some member of the conspiracy'.^[17] He concluded that it was sufficient for the government to demonstrate that each conspirator 'specifically intended that some conspirator commit each element of the substantive offense'.^[18] Additionally, Justice Alito rejected Ocasio's argument that the conspiracy conviction should be reversed because Ocasio and the auto shop were simply exchanging 'their own' money; instead, Justice Alito held that the convictions were justified because other Baltimore police officers were involved in the underlying substantive violations.^[19]

Justice Alito also rejected Ocasio's argument that the Court's 'interpretation makes the Hobbs Act sweep too broadly, creating a national antibribery law and displacing a carefully crafted network of state and federal statutes'.^[20] In Evans v. United States,^[21] the Court had explained that an act of extortion under the Hobbs act was the 'rough equivalent' of bribery.^[22] Because Ocasio did not ask the court to overrule Evans and because the Court had 'no occasion to do so' sua sponte, Justice Alito held that 'we have no principled basis for precluding the prosecution of conspiracies to commit' extortion under the Hobbs act.^[22] Justice Alito also rejected the argument that the Court's ruling would 'transform every bribe of a public official into a conspiracy to commit extortion' because '[i]n cases where the bribe payor is merely complying with an official demand, the payor lacks the mens rea necessary for a conspiracy'.^[23] Consequently, because Ocasio entered into an agreement to extort money 'under color of official right', the Court affirmed Ocasio's conviction.^[24]

Justice Breyer's concurring opinion[edit]

Although he 'join[ed] the majority’s opinion in full', Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion to explain that Evans v. United States 'may well have been wrongly decided'.^[25] Justice Breyer wrote that '[t]he present case underscores some of the problems that Evans raises', but he ultimately agreed with the majority's conclusion because 'we must in this case take Evans as good law'.^[26] However, Justice Breyer argued that 'it is an exceptionally difficult question' whether the Hobbs Act's definition of extortion was equivalent to bribery.^[27]

Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion[edit]

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that Ocasio's conviction should be reversed because 'an extortionist cannot conspire to commit extortion with the person whom he is extorting'.^[28] He stated that the majority opinion 'further exposes the flaw in this Court’s understanding of extortion'.^[29] Justice Thomas argued that this misunderstanding originated in the Court's prior opinion in Evans v. United States, which, according to Justice Thomas, 'wrongly equated extortion with bribery'.^[29] In Evans, Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that under the Hobbs Act, 'the only perpetrator is the public official; the payor is a victim and not a participant'.^[30] Relying upon this principle, Justice Thomas reiterated that it is not possible for an extortionist and 'his payor-victim can be co-conspirators to extortion of the payor'.^[31] Justice Thomas criticized the majority for taking 'another step away from the common-law understanding of extortion that the Hobbs Act adopted', and argued that '[o]nly by blurring the distinction between bribery and extortion could Evans make it seem plausible that an extortionist and a victim can conspire to extort the victim'.^[32]

Justice Thomas also criticized the majority for expanding federal criminal law in a manner that he argued was inconsistent with the principles of [federalism.^[33] He characterized the Hobbs Act as an example of the 'stunning expansion' into the area of anti-corruption laws, which he argued were 'traditionally policed by state and local laws'.^[34] Additionally, Justice Thomas stated that the authors of the Hobbs Act did not intend to enable the regulation of state officials by federal prosecutors, and he characterized the expansion of the Hobbs act as an 'invasion of state sovereignty'.^[35] He wrote, 'as in Evans, the Court reaches its decision with barely a nod to the sovereignty interests that it tramples'.^[36] For those reasons, Justice Thomas dissented from the Court's majority opinion.^[28]

Justice Sotomayor's dissenting opinion[edit]

Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she was joined by Chief JusticeJohn Roberts.^[37] She criticized the majority's conclusion as 'not a natural or logical way to interpret' the Hobbs Act's definition of extortion, which requires property to be extorted 'from another'.^[38] Citing dictionary definitions of the word 'another' and the Court's prior conspiracy law jurisprudence, Justice Sotomayor argued that an individual should only be found guilty of conspiring to commit extortion when they plan to extort an individual who is not a member of the conspiracy.^[39] Likewise, she also distinguished other cases in which criminal defendants were also the 'victim[s] of the crime' in those cases.^[40] Justice Sotomayor ultimately concluded her opinion by stating that the majority reached 'an unnatural outcome predicated on an unsupported assumption'.^[41]

Commentary and analysis[edit]

In his analysis for The George Washington Law Review, Randall Eliason wrote that the Court's decision 'doesn’t represent some new watershed in white collar crime or dramatic expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction', but rather, that the Court's ruling was 'simply the logical and unfortunate outgrowth of a questionable Supreme Court decision more than three decades old.'^[42] Additionally, in his review of the Court's opinion for SCOTUSblog, Rory Little wrote that the majority's opinion 'does not seem wrong as a matter of case-specific practical reality' but that the case may 'raise more questions than answers for future federal official right extortion prosecutions.'^[9]Jonathan H. Adler also characterized the Court's ruling as one of several cases released in early 2016, including Luis v. United States and Bank Markazi v. Peterson, that 'produced some particularly interesting divisions among the justices'.^[43]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

1. ^Ocasio v. United States, No. 14-361, 578U.S. ___, slip op. at 1, 5, 18 (2016).
2. ^ ^abcOcasio, slip op. at 2.
3. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 3. 11–14.
4. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 1, 18.
5. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 1–2 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that he 'join[ed] the majority’s opinion in full.').
6. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 1, 3–6 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
7. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 1, 11 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
8. ^See, e.g., Randall Eliason, Response, The Contortionist Extortionist: Response to United States v. Ocasio, Geo. Wash. L. Rev. On the Docket (May 10, 2016).
9. ^ ^abRory Little, Opinion analysis: Federal conspiracy law reaches persons who agree to obtain secret kickbacks from a member of the conspiracy, SCOTUSblog (May 2, 2016) (internal quotations omitted).
10. ^ ^abOcasio, slip op. at 1–2.
11. ^18 U.S.C.§ 1951.
12. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 3 (internal quotations omitted) (noting that Ocasio based his request on the Sixth Circuit's ruling in United States v. Brock, 501 F.3d762 (6th Cir. 2007)).
13. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 4 (noting that '[t]he District Court denied [Ocasio's] motions, concluding that the Fourth Circuit had already rejected Brock’s holding in United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1986)).
14. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 4 (citing United States v. Ocasio, 750 F.3d399 (4th Cir. 2014)).
15. ^Ocasio v. United States, 574 U.S. ___ (2015) (granting certiorari).
16. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 10.
17. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 5 (quoting 2 K. O’Malley, J. Grenig, & W. Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions: Criminal §31:03, p. 225 (6th ed. 2008)) (emphasis in original).
18. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 10 (emphasis in original).
19. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 11–14.
20. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 14–16.
21. ^Evans v. United States, 504U.S.255, 260 (1992).
22. ^ ^abOcasio, slip op. at 14.
23. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 16.
24. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 18.
25. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 1–2 (Breyer, J., concurring).
26. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 2 (Breyer, J., concurring).
27. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 1 (Breyer, J., concurring).
28. ^ ^abOcasio, slip op. at 6 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
29. ^ ^abOcasio, slip op. at 1 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
30. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 3 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Evans, 504 U.S. at 283 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
31. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 3 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
32. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 3–4 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
33. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 4–6 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
34. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 3 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Evans, 504 U.S. at 290 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
35. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 4–5 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
36. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 5 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
37. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
38. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ('If a group of conspirators sets out to extort 'another' person, we ordinarily think that they are proposing to extort money or property from a victim outside their group, not one of themselves.').
39. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 3–6 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
40. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 6–11 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
41. ^Ocasio, slip op. at 11 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
42. ^Randall Eliason, Response, The Contortionist Extortionist: Response to United States v. Ocasio, Geo. Wash. L. Rev. On the Docket (May 10, 2016).
43. ^Jonathan H. Adler, Today’s interesting Supreme Court lineupThe Washington Post (May 2, 2016).

External links[edit]

• Text of Ocasio v. United States, 578U.S. ___ (2016) is available from: JustiaOyez (oral argument audio)Supreme Court (slip opinion)

Institutional logic is a core concept in sociological theory and organizational studies, with growing interest in marketing theory. It focuses on how broader belief systems shape the cognition and behavior of actors.^[1]

Friedland and Alford (1991) wrote: 'Institutions are supraorganizational patterns of human activity by which individuals and organizations produce and reproduce their material subsistence and organize time and space. They are also symbolic systems, ways of ordering reality, and thereby rendering experience of time and space meaningful'.^[2] Friedland and Alford (1991, p. 248) elaborated: 'Each of the most important orders of contemporary Western societies has a central logic – a set of material practices and symbolic constructions – which constitute its organising principles and which is available to organizations and individuals to elaborate.' Thornton and Ocasio (1999: 804) define institutional logics as 'the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality'.^[3]

Overview[edit]

Focusing on macro-societal phenomena, Friedland and Alford (1991: 232) identified several key Institutions: the Capitalist market, bureaucratic state, democracy, nuclear family, and Christianity that are each guided by a distinct institutional logic. Thornton (2004) revised Friedland and Alford’s (1991) inter-institutional scheme to six institutional orders, i.e., the market, the corporation, the professions, the state, the family, and religions. More recently, Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury (2012), in more fully fleshing out the institutional logic perspective, added community as another key institutional order. This revision to a theoretically abstract and analytically distinct set of ideal types makes it useful for studying multiple logics in conflict and consensus, the hybridization of logics, and institutions in other parts of society and the world. While building on Friedland and Alford’s scheme, the revision addresses the confusion created by conflating institutional sectors with ideology (democracy) and means of organization (bureaucracy), variables that can be characteristic several different institutional sectors. The institutional logic of Christianity leaves out other religions in the US and other religions that are dominant in other parts of the world. Thornton and Ocasio (2008) discuss the importance of not confusing the ideal types of the inter-institutional system with a description of the empirical observations in a study—that is to use the ideal types as meta theory and method of analysis.

New institutionalism[edit]

Organizational theorists operating within the new institutionalism (see also institutional theory) have begun to develop the institutional logics concept by empirically testing it. One variant emphasizes how logics can focus the attention of key decision-makers on a particular set of issues and solutions (Ocasio, 1997), leading to logic-consistent decisions (Thornton, 2002). A fair amount of research on logics has focused on the importance of dominant logics and shifts from one logic to another (e.g., Lounsbury, 2002; Thornton, 2002; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Haveman and Rao (1997) showed how the rise of Progressive thought enabled a shift in savings and loan organizational forms in the U.S. in the early 20th century. Scott et al. (2000) detailed how logic shifts in healthcare led to the valorization of different actors, behaviors and governance structures. Thornton and Ocasio (1999) analyzed how a change from professional to market logics in U.S. higher education publishing led to corollary changes in how executive succession was carried out.

While much earlier work focused on ambiguity as a result of multiple and conflicting institutional logics, at the levels of analysis of society and individual roles,^[4] Friedland and Alford (1991:248-255) discussed in theory multiple and competing logics at the macro level of analysis. Recent empirical research, inspired by the work of Bourdieu, is developing a more pluralistic approach by focusing on multiple competing logics and contestation of meaning.^[5] By focusing on how some fields are composed of multiple logics, and thus, multiple forms of institutionally-based rationality, institutional analysts can provide new insight into practice variation and the dynamics of practice.^[6] Multiple logics can create diversity in practice by enabling variety in cognitive orientation and contestation over which practices are appropriate. As a result, such multiplicity can create enormous ambiguity, leading to logic blending, the creation of new logics, and the continued emergence of new practice variants. Thornton, Jones, and Kury (2005) showed how competing logics may never resolve but share the market space as in the case of architectural services.

Recent research has also documented the co-existence or potential conflict of multiple logics within particular organizations. Zilber (2002), for example, described the organizational consequences of a shift from one logic to another within an Israeli rape crisis center, in which new organization members reshaped the center and its practices to reflect a new dominant logic that they have carried into the organization.^[7] Tilcsik (2010) documented a logic shift in a post-Communist government agency, describing a conflict between the agency's old guard (carriers of the logic of Communist state bureaucracies) and its new guard (carriers of a market logic). This study shows that, paradoxically, an intra-organizational group's efforts to resist a particular logic might in fact open the organization's door to carriers of that very logic.^[8] Almandoz (2012) examined the embeddedness of new local banks' founding teams in a community logic or a financial logic, linking institutional logics to new banking venture's establishment and entrepreneurial success.^[9] As these studies demonstrate, the institutional logics perspective offers valuable insights into important intra-organizational processes affecting organizational practices, change, and success. These studies represent an effort to understand institutional complexity due to conflicting or inconsistent logics within particular organizations, a situation that might results from the entry of new organization members or the layering (or 'sedimentation') of new organizational imprints upon old ones over time.^[10]

Institutional theory in marketing[edit]

This growing area of research highlights the way that market structures, processes and consumer behaviors can be shaped by different institutional logics.^[11] For example, different rhetorical strategies grounded in particular institutional logics might be used in order to better persuade potential consumers.^[12]

Historicizing institutional logics[edit]

Recent work in institutional theory has attempted to bring historiography into our understanding of institutions. In particular, scholars have drawn onto the Annales School in history. Concepts such as mentalities, critical events, and time horizon have been mapped out and explained in institutional terms, to be mobilized in future research.^[13][14]Such theoretical framework complements existing apparatus in institutional theory, in the sense that it helps understand historical and temporal dynamics in institutional theory.

See also[edit]

References[edit]

1. ^Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton, 2004
2. ^Friedland, Roger, and Robert R. Alford. 1991. Bringing Society Back in: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions. Pp. 232-266 in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 243.
3. ^Thornton, Patricia, H. and William Ocasio (2008). “Institutional Logics,” in Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Kerstin Sahlin and Roy Suddaby (eds.) Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, CA: Sage.
4. ^(Boltanski and Thevenot ([1986] 1991)
5. ^(Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Schneiberg, 2007)
6. ^(see Lounsbury, 2001; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007)
7. ^Zilber, T. B. (2002). 'Institutionalization as an Interplay between Actions, Meanings, and Actors: The Case of a Rape Crisis Center in Israel.' Academy of Management Journal, 45(1), 234-254.
8. ^Tilcsik, A. (2010). 'From ritual to reality: Demography, ideology, and decoupling in a post-communist government agency.' Academy of Management Journal, 53(6), 1474-1498. Abstract
9. ^Almandoz, J. (2012). 'Arriving at the Starting Line: The Impact of Community and Financial Logics on New Banking Ventures.' Academy of Management Journal.
10. ^Marquis, Christopher; Tilcsik, András (2013-06-01). 'Imprinting: Toward a Multilevel Theory'. Academy of Management Annals. 7 (1): 195–245. CiteSeerX10.1.1.728.6149. doi:10.1080/19416520.2013.766076. ISSN1941-6520.
11. ^Ben Slimane, Karim; Chaney, Damien; Humphreys, Ashlee; Leca, Bernard (2019-12-01). 'Bringing institutional theory to marketing: Taking stock and future research directions'. Journal of Business Research. 105: 389–394. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.06.042. ISSN0148-2963.
12. ^Hartman, Anna E.; Coslor, Erica (2019-12-01). 'Earning while giving: Rhetorical strategies for navigating multiple institutional logics in reproductive commodification'. Journal of Business Research. 105: 405–419. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.05.010. ISSN0148-2963.
13. ^Clemente, Marco; Durand, Rodolphe; Roulet, Thomas (2017-01-01). 'The Recursive Nature of Institutional Change: An Annales School Perspective'. Journal of Management Inquiry. 26 (1): 17–31. doi:10.1177/1056492616656408. ISSN1056-4926. S2CID147794834.
14. ^Wang, Milo Shaoqing; Steele, Christopher W. J.; Greenwood, Royston (2019-04-01). 'Mentalités and Events: Historicizing Institutional Logics'(PDF). Academy of Management Review. 44 (2): 473–476. doi:10.5465/amr.2018.0370. ISSN0363-7425.

Ocasio 1997 Chicago Bulls

Further reading[edit]

Ocasio 1997 Topps

• Boltanski, Luc and Laurent Thevenot ([1986] 1991). On Justification Economies of Worth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Friedland, Roger, and Robert R. Alford. 1991. Bringing Society Back in: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions. pp. 232–266 in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Gillett, Alex G., and Kevin D. Tennent. 2018. Shadow hybridity and the institutional logic of professional sport: Perpetuating a sporting business in times of rapid social and economic change. Journal of Management History 24.2: 228-259: https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/JMH-11-2017-0060
• Haveman, Heather A., and Hayagreeva Rao. 1997. Structuring a Theory of Moral Sentiments: Institutional and Organizational Coevolution in the Early Thrift Industry. American Journal of Sociology 102: 1606-1651.
• Lounsbury, Michael. 2001. Institutional Sources of Practice Variation: Staffing College and University Recycling Programs. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46: 29-56.
• Lounsbury, Michael. 2002. Institutional Transformation and Status Mobility: The Professionalization of the Field of Finance. Academy of Management Journal, 45: 255-266.
• Lounsbury, Michael. 2007. A Tale of Two Cities: Competing Logics and Practice Variation in the Professionalizing of Mutual Funds. Academy of Management Journal, 50: 289-307
• Lounsbury, Michael & Ellen T. Crumley. 2007. New Practice Creation: An Institutional Approach to Innovation. Organization Studies, 28: 993-1012.
• Lounsbury, Michael & Eva Boxenbaum (Eds.) 2013. Institutional Logics in Action, Volumes 39 a and b of Research in the Sociology of Organizations.
• Marquis, Chris & Lounsbury, Michael. 2007. Vive la Résistance: Competing Logics in the Consolidation of Community Banking. Academy of Management Journal, 50: 799-820.
• Ocasio W. 1997. Towards an Attention-Based View of the Firm. Strategic Management Journal, 18:187-206.
• Schneiberg, Marc. 2007 ‘What’s on the Path? Path dependence, organizational diversity and the problem of institutional change in the U.S. economy, 1900-1950’. Socio-Economic Review 5: 47-80.
• Scott, W Richard, Martin Ruef, Peter Mendel, and Carol Caronna. 2000. Institutional Change and Healthcare Organizations: From Professional Dominance to Managed Care. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Suddaby, R. and R. Greenwood. 2005. Rhetorical strategies of legitimacy. Administrative Science Quarterly, 50(1): 35-67.
• Thornton, Patricia H., and William Ocasio. 1999. Institutional Logics and the Historical Contingency of Power in Organizations: Executive Succession in the Higher Education Publishing Industry, 1958-1990. American Journal of Sociology 105: 801-843.
• Thornton, P.H. 2002. The Rise of the Corporation in a Craft Industry: Conflict and Conformity in Institutional Logics. Academy of Management Journal, 45: 81-101.
• Thornton, P.H. 2004. Markets from Culture: Institutional Logics and Organizational Decisions in Higher Education Publishing. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
• Thornton, Patricia, Candace Jones, and Kenneth Kury 2005. “Institutional Logics and Institutional Change: Transformation in Accounting, Architecture, and Publishing, in Candace Jones and Patricia H. Thornton (eds.) Research in the Sociology of Organizations, London: JAI.
• Thornton, Patricia H. and William Ocasio (2008). “Institutional Logics,” in Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Kerstin Sahlin and Roy Suddaby (eds.) Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, CA: Sage.
• Thornton, Patricia H., William Ocasio, and Michael Lounsbury (2012). The Institutional Logics Perspective: A New Approach to Culture, Structure and Process. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Ocasio 1997 Fleer